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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 06-4487
________________
JOHN ALDRIDGE,
                               Appellant
    v.
DAVID GOOD, Superintendent; ROBERT MILLER, Plumber;
TONY BARAN, Maintenance Manager; WILLIAM ARCHEY,
Fire Safety Officer
____________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00253J)
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson
_______________________________________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
June 21, 2007
Before:  MCKEE, FUENTES AND VAN ANTWERPEN, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed:    July 18, 2007)
_______________________
 OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
John Aldridge appeals from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Pennsylvania’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 
2We will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915(e)(2)(B).
Aldridge alleges that his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and
unusual punishment was violated when he was exposed to asbestos during a maintenance
repair at SCI-Cresson.  Aldridge claims that Defendant Miller, a plumber at the prison,
cut through an insulated pipe on December 8, 2004, in order to repair it.  According to
Aldridge, Miller failed to take precautions to contain the asbestos that came from the
pipe, and the powdery substance “covered the floor and wall surfaces.”  Miller left the
pipe exposed and did not return to wrap the pipe until the next day.  
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or alternatively, a motion for summary
judgment, arguing, inter alia, that Aldridge had not exhausted administrative remedies. 
The District Court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and directed Aldridge
to respond.  Aldridge did.  The magistrate judge agreed with the defendants that Aldridge
failed to exhaust, and recommended that the defendants’ motion be granted.  Over
Aldridge’s objections, the District Court adopted the recommendation, granting summary
judgment.  This timely appeal followed.
   We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s decision to grant summary
judgment.  See Torres v. Fauver, 292 F.3d 141, 145 (3d Cir. 2002).  Under 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a), prisoners are required to exhaust available administrative remedies before
bringing a civil rights action concerning prison conditions, regardless of whether these
remedies can provide the inmate with the relief sought.  See Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S.
731, 741 (2001).  The Pennsylvania Department of Corrections has a three-tier grievance
3system which serves as prisoners’ administrative remedy.  See Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d
218, 232 (3d Cir. 2004). 
The record clearly reflects – and Aldridge concedes – that he did not pursue any
steps in the available grievance procedure.  Aldridge maintains that he is entitled to an
exception for numerous reasons:  he was ignorant of the law; by the time he had decided
to take action the fifteen-day period had elapsed; a fellow inmate had already filed a
grievance regarding the same situation; asking for grievance forms causes friction
between inmates and officers; and, engaging in the grievance procedure would have
“serve[d] no purpose to the relief” he seeks.  Despite Aldridge’s assertions, the
exhaustion requirement is not excused.  See Booth, 532 U.S. at 739-41 (2001); Spruill,
372 F.3d at 227-30.  
Because Aldridge did not exhaust administrative remedies as required by 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a), the District Court properly granted summary judgment.  Accordingly,
the appeal lacks merit, and we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).    
